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Summary
The term "language evolution" is used in two different ways in the literature:
- the biological evolution of the human language faculty
- the cultural evolution of human languages
The course will be concerned with the second notion. Natural languages can be considered
as evolving entities, similar to species in biology. Accordingly, language change can be
conceptualized as an evolutionary process. Linguistic universals are features of
languages that are invariant in evolutionarily stable states.
We will study formal models of language evolution in this sense. Evolutionary Game
Theory (EGT) -- a mathematical framework that emerged from collaboration between
biologists and economists -- has proven a useful metatheory for this kind of endeavor. The
first half of the course will consist of a crash course of EGT. The second part of the
course deals with various linguistic applications, ranging from phonology via morphology
and syntax to semantics. The investigations make heavy use of computer simulations, and
the course will also deal with practical implementation issues.
Credits
To take the course for credit, it is required to attend
classes regularly and to write an essay of 6-8 pages. Possible topics
are
- Equilibrium notions:
Explain the concepts "Nash equilibrium", "Strict Nash equilibrium",
"Evolutionarily stable strategy" and "Stochastic stability". How are
they justified, and under what conditions can they be applied?
[Literature: lecture slides, Jäger 2004]
- Vowel systems: What
is a vowel (in terms of acoustic phonetics), what are universal
tendencies in the typological distribution of vowel systems, how can
these tendencies be explained in an evolutionary model? [Literature:
lecture slides, Jäger 2006: Spiel mit Lauten]
- Case marking systems:
What are accusative systems and ergative systems, what are universal
tendencies in the typology of case marking systems, how are they
derived in Jäger (in press), what is the empirical basis of the
utility function used in that paper.
- Horn strategies:
What is a Horn strategy; what are linguistic examples for Horn
strategies; what are the Nash equilibria of the Horn game; which
strategy combinations are evolutionarily stable; how can the dominance
of the Horn strategy over the anti-Horn strategy be explained [Literature: lecture slides, Jäger 2004]
The essays should be turned in via email to Gerhard Jäger no later than October 31st.
Slides
Reading
- Benz, A., G. Jäger and R. van Rooij (2005), An
introduction to game
theory for linguists, in A. Benz, G. Jäger
and R. van Rooij
(eds.), Game Theory and
Pragmatics, Palgrave McMillan. [password required for
download]
- Jäger,
G. (2004), Evolutionary
Game Theory for linguists. A primer, manuscript, Stanford
University and University of Potsdam
- Jäger, G. (in press), Evolutionary
Game Theory and Typology. A Case Study, to appear in Language
- Jäger, G. (2006), Convex
meanings and evolutionary stability, in Angelo Cangelosi,
Andrew D. M. Smith and Kenny Smith (eds.), The
Evolution of Language. Proceedings of the 6th
International
Conference (EVOLANG6), Rome, pp 139-144.
- Jäger, G. and R. van Rooij (in press), Language
Stucture: Psychological and Social
Constraints, to appear in Synthese
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