ON ADVICE MODALITY

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1. Overview

(1) Motivation for the modal flavor of advice
(2) Russian stoit: a modal specialized for advice uses
(3) Decomposing the distribution of stoit
(4) Condoravdi-Lauer framework for performatives
(5) Formal analysis of stoit
(6) The semantic core of symbouletic modality: stoit vs. other symbouletics
(7) Explaining the rise of idiosyncratic properties of stoit diachronically
(8) Framework for combining general and idiosyncratic semantic properties: pragmatic magnets vs. persistence of surface usage patterns
2. INTRODUCING SYMBOULETIC MODALITY

- Natural language modals may express different modality types.
- The standard approach to modeling those types ("modal flavors"), cf. [Kratzer, 1981], is to use different accessibility relations.

Consider three “priority” modal flavors (see [Portner, 2009]):

1. Students **must** pass an oral final exam in this class.
   
   **Deontic:** \( wRw' \) iff the rules if \( w \) declare \( w' \) a rule-abiding world.

2. To get to the Polar Bear Park, you **have to** take a plane.
   
   **Teleological:** \( wRw' \) iff the relevant goals in \( w \) are reached in \( w' \).

3. Their idea is that education **must** help children build self-confidence.
   
   **Bouletic:** \( wRw' \) iff the speaker’s desires in \( w \) are reached in \( w' \).

- However...

4. You **should** go to that concert! (You’ll really like it.)

Not quite (pure-)deontic: no rules involved, even “personal” ones.

Not quite (pure-)teleological: no (previously established) goal involved.

Not quite (pure-)bouletic: no (previously established) desires involved.

- Deontic, teleological, bouletic flavors are inherently static.

They describe the optimal state of affairs given a particular set of facts. By themselves, they do not induce any action, though they may be used in practical reasoning that does.

- In contrast to that, [4] has a dynamic effect. It is a *suggestion* for the addressee to take a particular action.

[4] may be later reported with [5] which may also report an imperative in [6]

5. She told me to go to that concert.

6. Go to that concert!
Can we account for the advice flavor within Kratzer’s modal semantics? Suppose *should* in (4) uses this accessibility relation:

(7) “Suggestion accessibility” (wrong):
\[ wRw' \text{ iff what the speaker suggested in } w \text{ is true in } w'. \]

Even though “suggest” is used as a primitive in (7), it does not help:

(8) Applying “suggested accessibility” (wrong):
\[ [4] = \text{going to the concert is among those things that the speaker suggested in } w. \]

The problem with (8) is that it is descriptive, static. As such, it does not have a performative force, and we should be able to challenge it as a lie. But:

(9) *Ann*: You have to do the dishes!
*Mary*: OK You’re lying! (Today is your turn.)

(10) *Ann*: You should go to that concert!
*Mary*: # You’re lying! (That’s not what you are suggesting!)

(11) *Ann*: Go to that concert!
*Mary*: # You’re lying!

⇒ “Advice *should*” patterns with imperatives, not with static modals.

We have enough reason to distinguish “advice” uses in English. But studying them directly is hard: *should* is multiply ambiguous.

Fortunately, Russian has a modal that is specialized for advice: *stoit*.

3. Russian *stoit*: An advice/suggestion modal

In (12) *stoit* is perfectly normal:

(12) *Advice/suggestion*

\[
\text{OK Tebe stoit poexatj v otpusk.} \\
\text{you.DAT STOIT go to vacation}
\]
‘You should take a vacation.’

- *stoit* cannot be used in objective deontic contexts. In 13, we force the objective deontic interpretation by using “according to the rules”:

(13) Deontic, objective

* Soglasno pravilam, tebe stoit sdatj otčot do according rules you.DAT STOIT submit report before zavtra. tomorrow

‘According to the rules, you should submit the report before tomorrow.’

- In subjective deontic contexts, *stoit* cannot express obligations. If a parent wants to order a child to go to sleep, 14 is bad:

(14) Deontic, subjective

# Tebe stoit pojti spatj. you.DAT STOIT go sleep

‘You must go to sleep.’

Unlike 13, 14 is not ungrammatical: the sentence may be used in the parent-to-child context, but only to convey a suggestion, not to impose an obligation.

- In teleological contexts, *stoit* may be used, but again, only to suggest a particular course of action.

We test this using the continuation “...but I wouldn’t advise that”:

(15) Čtoby povysitj svoi šansi, Maše {stoit/OKnužno} in.order.to improve her chances Masha.DAT STOIT/NUŽNO kupitj vtoroj loterejnyj bilet. No ja by ej ne sovetoval. buy second lottery ticket. But I would to her not advise

‘To improve her chances, Masha ought to buy a second lottery ticket. But I wouldn’t advise that.’

- *stoit* is a **symbouletic** modal: modal of advice and suggestion.
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4. SEMANTIC PROPERTIES OF *stoit*

- Suppose \( x \) asserted \( *stoit(y,p) \).

- **Decision:** \( y \) has the control over whether a \( p \)-future will actualize or not, and it is not yet given that \( p \) will actualize.

  In [16], there is no choice involved (one can only get to the Polar Bear Park by plane), and \( *stoit \) is ruled out. In [17] there is choice, and \( *stoit \) is fine.

(16)  
**Teleological, 1 option**

  *Čtoby dobratjsja do Polar Bear parka, tebe *stoit letetj in.order.to get to Polar Bear park, you.DAT STOIT fly na samolete. on plane

  ‘To get to the Polar Bear Park, you’d better fly on the plane.’

(17)  
**Teleological, many options**

  Čtoby dobratjsja do Stenforda, tebe *stoit letetj na in.order.to get to Stanford, you.DAT STOIT go on samolete. plane

  ‘To get to Stanford, you’d better fly on the plane.’

In [18] the second clause rules out getting into college as a possible future for the subject. \( *stoit \) is bad, while general-purpose deontic \( nužno \) is fine:

(18)  
Ej  \{*stoit/OK/nužno\} postupitj v universitet, no ona she.DAT STOIT/NUŽNO get.admitted into college but she ne smožet. NEG will.be.able

  ‘She should get into college, but she will not be able to.’

- **Advice consistency:** after asserting \( *stoit(y,p) \), the speaker cannot advise \( y \) to \( \neg p \).

  For an example, see [15].
- **Subject benefit**: speaker $x$ is required to believe that $y$ is of direct benefit to $y$, the subject of *stoit*.

(19) Tebe *stoit* načatj rabotatj v šeltere 40 časov v nedelju.
    you.DAT STOIT start working in shelter 40 hours per week
    ‘You should start working in the shelter 40 hours a week.’

*-context*: we agree that it is morally good to do a lot of volunteer work.

OK-context: you are currently experiencing serious psychological issues, and it seems that working a lot for the common good, even without pay, is going to help you regain your lost sense of self-worth.

- **Rejection**: when *stoit*-claims are not accepted, the **Subject benefit** component may be challenged, \[22\] For comparison, imperatives may not be challenged, \[21\]

(20) *Mary*: Tebe *stoit* pojti na etot koncert.
    you.DAT STOIT go to that concert
    ‘You should go to that concert.’

    *Ann*: OK Ty ošibeješja. Mne ne nравitsja etot dirižor.
    you are.wrong I NEG like that conductor
    ‘You are wrong. I don’t like that conductor.’

(21) *Control case: imperatives*

    *Mary*: Prinesi mne tu knigu, požalujsta.
    bring me that book please
    ‘Bring me that book, please’

    *Ann*: # Ty ošibeješja.
    you are.wrong.
    ‘You are wrong.’

However, not all content of a *stoit*-claim may be rejected. First, one cannot disagree that the speaker of a matrix *stoit*-claim made some suggestion. Second, the speaker of a *stoit*-claim may not be directly accused of lying:
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(22) *Mary:* Tebe stoit poštite na etot koncert.

‘You should go to that concert.’

*Ann:* # Ty ošibaješja.

‘You are wrong.’

- **Embeddability:** *stoi* can be embedded in questions, under the past tense, under attitude verbs.

(23) Stoit li mne zapisatlja na etot klass?

‘Should I register for that class (I wonder)?’

(24) Maša teperj dumajet, što Ane stoilo tuda poštite.

‘Now Masha thinks that (according to Masha’s current information), it would have been better (given the circumstances back then) if Anya went there.’

When *stoi* is embedded under an attitude verb, **Advice consistency** and **Subject benefit** “shift” to the attitude bearer.

- **Scope over Neg:** when *stoi* occurs with a clausemate sentential negation, it always scopes over it:

(25) Context: The addressee has a choice of going to Boston, NYC or Philadelphia.

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1It is common, since [Condoravdi, 2002], to distinguish two temporal characteristics of a modal. The **temporal perspective** determines at which time the accessibility relation is computed; e.g., in epistemic *Mary must arrive soon*, the temporal perspective is present as it is the present knowledge that forms the epistemic accessibility relation. The **temporal orientation** of the modal, on the other hand, concerns the relation between the time given by the temporal perspective and the time of *P* in *modal(P)*. In the same example *Mary must arrive soon*, the temporal orientation is future: Mary’s arrival is in the future from the moment relative to which the epistemic accessibility relation is computed.

In [24] we need not two, but three temporal parameters: first, it is Masha’s present opinion that matters; second, it is the past circumstances that matter; third, the event of Anya going there is in the future counting from the time at which the relevant circumstances hold. I will discuss how those three are determined in Section ??.
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Tebe ne stoit exatj v NYC
you.DAT not STOIT go to NYC

= ‘You shouldn’t go to NYC’ (□ > ¬)
≠ ‘It’s not that going to NYC is your best option.’ (¬ > □)

There is nothing wrong with the ¬ > stoit meaning as such:

(26) OK Eto ne značit, što tebe stoit exatj v NYC, vedj v
this not means that you.DAT STOIT go to NYC as in
Bostone tože interesno.
Boston also interesting
‘That does not mean you should go to NYC, because in Boston it’s
also fun.’

• Summing up:

- Decision: y has the control over whether a p-future will actualize or
  not, and it is not yet given that p will actualize.

- Advice consistency: after asserting stoit(y, p), the speaker cannot ad-
  vise y to ¬p.

- Subject benefit: speaker x is required to believe that y is of direct
  benefit to y, the subject of stoit.

- Rejection: when stoit-claims are not accepted, only the Subject ben-
  efit component may be challenged. For matrix claims, the speaker may
  not be accused of lying, and it is automatically accepted that a sugges-
  tion has been made.

- Embeddability: stoit can be embedded in questions, under the past
  tense, under attitude verbs.

- Scope over Neg: when stoit occurs with a clausalmate sentential nega-
  tion, it always scopes over it.

And importantly, we need to explain Performative force: stoit cannot fail
to have the force of a suggestion when not embedded.
5. CONDORAVDI-LAUER FRAMEWORK FOR PERFORMATIVITY

• The challenge of performatives:
  – Performatives may be embedded, so they seem to have regular propositional content that neutrally describes the reality.
  – But matrix assertions of performatives are self-verifying, not descriptive.

• The guiding ideas of [Condoravdi and Lauer, 2011], [Condoravdi and Lauer, 2012]:
  (1) Some preferences are effective: they may guide actions.
  (2) Public commitment to an effective preference constrains the future behavior of the agent.

⇒ Self-verification happens when the propositional content describes the agent’s own effective preferences.

• An assertion of \( p \) publicly commits the speaker to a belief in \( p \): after it, the speaker is required to behave as if she believes in \( p \).

• An agent \( x \) may have many conflicting preferences: “I want to go to the beach now”, “I want to go to the mountains now”, etc.

• However, one cannot act on the basis of inconsistent preferences: one has to choose. We say that \( x \) has an effective preference for \( p \) iff \( x \) is acting so that she may bring \( p \) about. Effective preferences have to be compatible with one another in order to allow rational action.

• Knowing the current effective preferences (EPs) of \( x \) allows us to predict \( x \)’s future actions.

Knowing both \( x \)’s effective preferences and \( x \)’s beliefs, we can perfectly predict \( x \)’s actions.

• When an agent makes an EP public, she provides information about how she will act.

• Public commitment to \( EP(p) \): I “promise” I will act so that I can bring \( p \) about.
• **An example**: [Condoravdi and Lauer, 2011] on directives (simplified).

\[
(27) \quad \text{I order you to sign the report immediately!}
\]

Presupposition: the speaker presumes to have authority over the addressee.

Assertion: “I believe that I am committed to an \(EP\) for proposition \(PEP(Addr, p)\), where \(p\) is “The addressee signs the report immediately”.

*Step 1.* By asserting the above, the speaker promises to behave as if she believes she is committed to the relevant \(EP\).

*Step 2.* In order to act as if the speaker believes that, she needs to act as if she has the relevant \(EP\).

*Step 3.* The speaker thus publicly committed to the relevant \(EP\).

\( \Rightarrow \) Self-verification happens because asserting \(27\) entails publicly committing to an effective preference.

• **Some performative meanings:**

  – Commissive that \(p\):
    
    \(Sp\) has a \(PEP\) for \(p\)

  – Directive that \(p\):
    
    \(Sp\) has a \(PEP\) for \(PEP(Addr, p)\)

  – Imperative that \(p\):
    
    \(Sp\) has a \(PEP\) for \(p\);
    
    plus some constraint making the addressee responsible for bringing \(p\) about, [Condoravdi and Lauer, 2012]
6. Formal analysis of *stoit*

6.1. The proposed semantics for *stoit*.

- Let *PRO* be the speaker in the matrix case, and the attitude bearer when *stoit* is embedded under an attitude verb. Let the “attitude” index of evaluation be the matrix index in the matrix case, and the index at which the attitude verb is evaluated when *stoit* is under an attitude.

- The proposed semantics for *stoit*(y, p):

  **Presupposition:**
  - at the evaluation time, y has control over achieving p

  **Assertion:**
  - **Assertion (part) 1**: it is personally beneficial for y at the local index to form an EP for p; in symbols, best(y, EP(y, p)).
  - **Assertion (part) 2**: if *PRO* at the attitude index prefers EP(y, p) at the local index, then EP(PRO, EP(y, p)) at the attitude index.

6.2. Explaining the properties of *stoit*.

- Property **Decision** is directly encoded into the presupposition.

- For **Advice consistency**, we need to commit to an analysis of *advise*, *recommend*, etc. I won’t defend a particular analysis here, but only note that such analysis in the present framework would involve the recommender suggesting to y that EP(y, p).

  This is enough to derive **Advice consistency** from the definition above.

- **Subject benefit** is asserted in Assertion 1.

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\(^2\)The technical definition uses Kratzer-style quantification over worlds, with the metaphysical modal base and stereotypical ordering source:

*y* has control over *p* at an index *i* iff among stereotypically optimal worlds among the metaphysically accessible worlds at index *i*, there are *p*-worlds and ¬*p*-worlds, and furthermore, there are actions available to *y* that bring about *p*, and similarly for ¬*p*. 
• **Embeddability** is expected: our semantics does not put any restrictions on embedding. If there are such, they would need to be accounted for by further constraints.

• Similarly for **Scope of Neg**: our semantics does not prevent *stoit* from appearing immediately in the scope of negation — just as it should be given that it can when the negation is not its clausemate.

• Explaining **Rejection** highlights the crucial properties of our semantics.

  **Assertion 1**, even though it mentions an EP by *y*, is a “regular”, non-performative assertion: it simply describes *PRO*’s beliefs about the world, and is not self-verifying. Therefore it can be challenged just as any regular assertion can.

  **Assertion 2**, on the other hand, is the performative part, which is self-verifying in the matrix case.

  (28) **Assertion 2**, informally *(the matrix case)*:

  “If I prefer for you to start acting towards *p*, then I will act so that you form an effective preference for acting towards *p*”

  Asserting this conditional EP is a public commitment by the speaker, a conditional promise to act in a particular way. As such, it is self-verifying.

  A self-verifying assertion cannot be challenged: it commits the speaker (NB: even if she was insincere!) to act in a certain way.

• A closer look at **Performative force**:

  **Step 1.** The speaker publicly commits to a belief that she has an EP for EP(*y*, *p*) conditional upon preferring EP(*y*, *p*).

  **Step 2.** Behaving as if she has such a belief entails behaving as if EP(*Sp*, EP(*y*, *p*)). Hence we have:

  \[ \text{public(prefer(*Sp*, EP(*y*, *p*)))} \rightarrow \text{EP(*Sp*, EP(*y*, *p*)))} \]

  **Step 3.** The speaker’s order to *y* to *p* is public(EP(*Sp*, EP(*y*, *p*))). Thus **Assertion 2** of *stoit* is a conditional directive.

  **Steps 4-5.** A conditional directive is stronger than a simple assertion that *p* would be good for *y*. Hence the intuition that *stoit*-claims urge people to do things, not just neutrally describe what’s best for them.
On the other hand, a conditional directive is weaker than a plain directive. Hence the intuition that the speaker of a stoit-claim leaves it to the addressee whether to act towards p.

⇒ stoit-claims are in between neutral factual assertions and commands.

Predicted by our semantics:

| Decision, Advice consistency, Subject benefit, Embeddability, Rejection, Performative force |
| Requires a separate constraint: Scope over Neg |

6.3. Predictions for the embedded cases.

- In questions:

  (29) Stoit li mne zapisatjsja na etot klass?
  STOIT Q I.DAT register for that class
  ‘Should I register for that class (I wonder)’

Predictions of our analysis for “Do I stoit p?”:

- the speaker cannot have an effective preference for p
- if she resolves with a “yes”, she forms a commitment
- two sources of potential uncertainty:
  * the speaker may be unsure if best(Sp, EP(Sp, p)) (Assertion 1)
  * even if sure that best(Sp, EP(Sp, p)), she may be unsure if spending the energy on achieving p is better for her than other things (=unsure whether forming an EP for p is the rational choice for her) (Assertion 2)

- Under attitudes:

  (30) Maša teperj dumajet, što Ane stoito tuda pojti.
  Masha now thinks that Anja STOIT.PAST there go
'Now Masha thinks that (according to Masha’s current information), it would have been better (given the circumstances back then) if Anya went there.'

*The attitude index:* the circumstances of Masha’s thinking.

*The local index:* the past circumstances when Anya faced the choice.

Our predictions:

– Presupposition and Assertion 1 are evaluated at the local index, so both concern the past situation, but the semantics of *think* connects them to Masha’s present mental state:
  
  * Masha is claimed to presuppose that Anya had control over going there.
  
  * Masha is claimed to believe now that back then, to go was best for Anya.

– The performative part, Assertion 2, belongs to the attitude level, not to the local level.

– The attitude ascription does not attribute to Masha a public *EP*: it only attributes to her a conditional commitment. Therefore we expect 30 to be potentially true even when Masha did not make any public suggestions.

• Using both the attitude and the local indices is crucial to derive the temporal sensitivity, placing the original decision problem and the suggestion into proper situations.

⇒ cf. [Hacquard, 2010] on two positions for modals under attitudes: for Hacquard, embedded epistemics are higher than tense, and are evaluated at the upper-clause index, while deontics and other root modals are lower than tense, and are evaluated at the lower-clause index.

In our analysis, *stoit* provides both “higher” and “lower” material.
7. THE PLACE OF STOIT AMONG OTHER SYMBOULETIC MODALS

- I take the core of symbouletic modality to consist of:
  Decision, Advice consistency, Performative force

- Suggestion uses of should or Russian nužno do not require Subject benefit:

  (31) Tebe nužno pomolčatj!
       you must shut up
       ‘You should shut up!’

- Rejection arises because stoit combines self-verifying Assertion 2 with regular Assertion 1. If an item does not have Assertion 1 in the first place (e.g., should or nužno), we won’t see the same pattern.

  However, for any suggestion modal the matrix unembedded occurrence will be unchallengable, due to its Performative force.

- English (’d) better is more restricted than stoit: it cannot appear under sentential negation or in questions.

  ⇒ Embeddability is not a universal restriction.

- I do not have examples of symbouletics which would not have Scope over Neg. But since there is nothing wrong with the meaning of ¬ > □, as we’ve seen, Scope over Neg must be an idiosyncratic constraint.

8. THE RISE OF SUBJECT BENEFIT AND SCOPE OVER NEG

- Semantic evolution of stoit (simplified):

  (1) Literal price:

  (2) Metaphorical price:
      (1845) “All the East does not stoit even an hour’s trip”
(3) **Without a price argument, implying action:**
   
   (1845) “It does not **stoit** to talk about her.”
   
   (1845) “It does not **stoit** to take care of ourselves” (=it has no meaning)
   
   (1914) “Perhaps it does not **stoit** to retype (the book).”

(4) **(More) direct suggestion for action, no price in the background:**
   
   (1975) “Perhaps it does not **stoit** be here any longer. It’s time to leave.”
   
   (1975) “But it does not **stoit** to get one’s hopes up.”

- The evolution is gradual, proceeding in micro-steps (cf. [Traugott and Dasher, 2002]). Many examples may be interpreted as either featuring an earlier or a later meaning.

- The distribution shifts slowly, so the uses of **stoit** at \(t+1\) is very similar to the uses at \(t\).

  \[\Rightarrow\] Persistence of surface usage patterns.

- The core semantics of advice/suggestion is a “magnet”: giving advice is a well-established pragmatic function, at least in English and Russian cultures.

- But in addition to providing advice, **stoit** retains the semantic features of its earlier stages due to the persistence of usage.

- **Subject benefit** diachronically:

  - Crucial fact: until the early 20th cent., **stoit** does not appear with pronominal subjects. The agent of action is inferred from the context, not named. Only in the second half of the 20th century does the schema “I/you/we **stoit** \(p\)” become common.

    For simplicity, let’s assume that the agent is “we”.

  - Pragmatic reasoning at stage 3:

    “\(p\) is worth the cost of getting it” \(\rightarrow\) “we should go for \(p\)”

    “\(p\) is not worth the cost of getting it” \(\rightarrow\) “we should not go for \(p\)”
For the above reasoning to go through, we need the following postulates:

- “if \( p \) is worth the cost of getting it, then \( p \) is beneficial for us”
- “if \( p \) is beneficial for us, we should go for \( p \)”

\( \Rightarrow \) the **Subject benefit** component is needed for inferring a suggestion, so it is natural that **Subject benefit** conventionalizes together with the suggestion inference.

**Scope over Neg** diachronically:

- The \( \neg > stoit \) meaning could not have been inferred directly from the earlier meanings:
  
  \[ \text{“p is not worth the cost” } \not\rightarrow \text{ “I don’t know whether we should go for p”} \]

- Since the suggestion \( stoit \) arose from conventionalizing inferences from metaphorical cost, \( \neg > stoit \) construals were not observed by the speakers in the available data.

- Right now, the scope restriction is conventionalized. But if there would be some pragmatic pressure for expressing the \( \neg > stoit \) meaning, we can expect the speakers to gradually lift the constraint.

• Once we look at the diachronic trajectory of \( stoit \), we can explain how its idiosyncratic properties arose!

9. **Pragmatic magnets vs. persistence of usage**

• Pragmatic forces may favor semantic change on the level of individual speech acts:
  
  (1) Masha says \( \alpha \) with literal meaning \( p \).
  
  (2) Anya takes her to imply \( q \) — but only if \( q \) is something that might be relevant in the context.

  If the inference is irrelevant, it’s not worth drawing in the first place.

• Inferences that arise frequently may get conventionalized on the level of the speech community:
  
  (1) Masha says “\( \alpha \)” to imply \( q \), and so do Petya, Sasha, Dasha...
(2) It becomes a convention that “α” conveys $q$.

- However, surface patterns of use constrain semantic change: speakers want to conform to what they hear around them.

- How pragmatic magnets and persistence of usage work together:
  - A $q$-magnet makes it possible for more and more utterances of “α” to imply $q$.
  - But at the same time “α”-s are most likely to be used in situations where they were already used before.
  - Hence in addition to the inference $q$, arising due to general pragmatic forces, the semantics of “α” is taken by the speakers to retain some features of its earlier distribution.

- Using $stoit$ as an example:
  - The function of giving advice creates a pragmatic magnet for $stoit$.
  - In the earlier times, $stoit$ is associated with personal benefit for the subject. Observing $stoit$’s earlier distribution, the speakers take Subject benefit to be conventionally conveyed.
  - The pragmatic magnet favors drawing the $stoit > \neg$ inference from metaphorical cost assertions, but there is no such magnet for $\neg > stoit$. Hence the new modal lexeme gets created by the speakers using a bunch of examples all of which feature $stoit > \neg$.

The semantics of suggestion $stoit$ does not prevent it from appearing in $\neg > stoit$, but without either support from earlier usage, or a pragmatic magnet, such uses will not arise. Hence $stoit$ has the Scope over Neg property.
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10. Conclusion

- Symbouletic modality: performative modality of advice
  - A new flavor of modality, apparently closely related to deontic and teleological, but unlike them, inherently dynamic

- Distinction between idiosyncratic and “core” properties for modals
  - Core properties arise because of pragmatic magnets, idiosyncratic properties reflect persistence of usage patterns
  - Helps to make sense of how general semantic natural classes such as “epistemic modality” or “deontic modality” get expressed by lexical items with a number of peculiar idiosyncratic properties

References


